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We analyse the interactions between public and private sector wages per employee in OECD 
countries. We motivate the analysis with a dynamic labour market equilibrium model with 
search and matching frictions to study the effects of public sector employment and wages on 
the labour market, particularly on private sector wages. Our empirical evidence shows that the 
growth of public sector wages and of public sector employment positively affects the growth 
of private sector wages. Moreover, total factor productivity, the unemployment rate, hours per 
worker, and inflation, are also important determinants of private sector wage growth. With 
respect to public sector wage growth, we find that,  in addition to  some  market related 
variables, it is also influenced by fiscal conditions. 
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Non-technical summary 
  The relevance of public wages for total public spending has gradually increased in 
the past decades in several European countries. Apart from the importance that such 
budgetary item has for the development of public finances and for attaining budgetary 
objectives, public sector employment and wages play a key  role on the labour market. 
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to understand the interactions between private 
and public sector wages.  
  First, we motivate the analysis with a dynamic labour market equilibrium model with 
search and matching frictions to study the effects of public sector employment and wages on 
the labour market. As in other models that address this issue, we find that public sector wages 
and employment have some impact on private sector wages. In essence, public sector wages 
and employment impinge on private sector wage, via two channels. On one hand, they affect 
the outside option of the unemployed, either by increasing the value of being employed in the 
public sector (public sector wage) or by increasing the probability of being hired by the public 
sector (public sector employment). Therefore, they put pressure on the wage bargaining. On 
the other hand, both public wages and employment have to be financed by an increase in 
taxes, which will reduce the overall gain from the match and increase the wage paid by the 
firm. In the model, an increase of 1% in public sector wages induces an increase of 0.1% in 
private sector wage. An increase in public employment of 1 percentage point of the labour 
force increases private sector wages by 0.45%. 
Second, we go on  assessing the determinants of private sector wage growth. We 
develop our analysis for the OECD and European Union countries for the period between 
1970 and 1998/2006 (depending on data availability). We carefully discuss the econometric 
issues involved, and how we deal with them, particularly the problem of endogeneity.   4 
  An additional purpose of the paper is to analyse as well what are the main 
determinants of public sector wages. For instance, public wages can also depend on the fiscal 
position. Moreover, public wages might be used as an instrument in terms of income policies, 
so they can depend on political factors such as the political alignment of the ruling party or 
election cycles.  
  In a nutshell, we empirically find that a number of variables affect private sector 
wage growth, for instance: changes in the unemployment rate (negative relationship), 
inflation rate, total factor productivity growth and hours per worker. Moreover, public sector 
wages and employment growth also affect private sector wage growth, which has important 
policy implications. In addition, regarding the public sector wages, statistically significant 
determinants are private sector wage growth, inflation, and changes in the unemployment rate 
(positive relationship). Public sector wages also react positively to the budget balance and 
negatively to government indebtedness, that is, to higher debt-to-GDP ratios.     
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1. Introduction 
  The relevance of public wages for total public spending has gradually increased in 
the past decades in several European countries.  Apart from the  importance  that such 
budgetary item has for the development of public finances and for  attaining budgetary 
objectives,
1 public sector  employment and wages  play a key role on the labour market. 
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to understand the interactions between private 
and public sector wages.  
  First, we motivate the analysis with a dynamic labour market equilibrium model with 
search and matching frictions to study the effects of public sector employment and wages on 
the labour market. As in other models that address this issue,
2 we find that public sector 
wages and employment have some impact on private sector wages. In essence, public sector 
wages and employment impinge on private sector wage, via two channels. On the one hand, 
they affect the outside option of the unemployed, either by increasing the value of being 
employed in the public sector (public sector wage) or by increasing the probability of being 
hired by the public sector (public sector employment). Therefore, they put pressure on the 
wage bargaining. On the other hand, both public wages and employment have to be financed 
by an increase in taxes, which will reduce the overall gain from the match and increase the 
wage paid by the firm. In the model, an increase of 1% in public sector wages induces an 
increase of 0.1% in private sector wage. An increase in public employment of 1 percentage 
point of the labour force increases private sector wages by 0.45%. 
  Second, w e go on assessing the determinants of private sector wage growth. We 
develop our analysis for the OECD and European Union countries for the period between 
                                                 
1 According to the European Commission, the average share of public wages (compensation of employees) in 
general government total spending was around 23 per cent in 2007 for the European Union, that is, around 11 
percent of GDP. Interestingly, the public wages-to-total government spending ratio was 28 per cent in 2006 in 
the US. See the Appendix for some illustrative country data. 
2 See, for instance, Holmlung and Lindén (1993), Algan et al. (2002) or Ardagna (2007).   6 
1970 and 1998/2006 (depending on data availability). We carefully discuss the econometric 
issues involved, and how we deal with them, particularly the problem of endogeneity. 
  An additional purpose of the paper is to  analyse  as well,  what  are  the main 
determinants of public sector wages. Although there is evidence of some pro-cyclicality of 
public wages (Lamo et al., 2007),  their developments may be less aligned with those of 
private wages. For instance, public wages can also depend on the fiscal position. In fact, 
Poterba and Ruben (1995) and Gyourko and Tracy (1989) find that fiscal conditions affect 
wages of public employees at a local level. Moreover, public wages  might be used as an 
instrument in terms of income policies, so they can depend on political  factors such as the 
political alignment of the ruling party or election cycles. For instance, Matschke (2003) finds 
evidence of systematic public wage increases prior to a federal election in Germany.  
  In a nutshell, we empirically find that a number of variables affect private sector 
wage growth, for instance:  changes  in the  unemployment rate (negative relationship), 
inflation rate, total factor productivity growth and hours per worker. Moreover, public sector 
wages and employment growth also affect private sector wage growth, which has important 
policy implications. In addition, regarding the public sector wages, statistically significant 
determinants are private sector wage growth, inflation, and changes in the unemployment rate 
(positive relationship). Public sector wages also react positively to the budget balance and 
negatively to government indebtedness, that is, to higher debt-to-GDP ratios. 
  The paper is organised as follows.  In section  two we present  an  analytical 
framework, relevant for the subsequent empirical analysis. In section three we present the 
empirical setting and in s ection  four  we  report  and discuss  the  results. Section  five 
summarises the paper’s main findings. 
 
   7 
2. Analytical framework 
2.1. The model 
We set up a dynamic labour market equilibrium model, with public and private sectors 
and search and matching frictions, along the lines of Pissarides (1988). The general setting 
shares some features with Quadrini and Trigari (2007). Public variables are denoted with 
superscript { g} while private sector variables are denoted by { p}. Households’ utility takes 
the form 
  (,) tttt ucgcg c =+ ,  (1) 
where  t c  is private consumption and  t g   is  the flow of services derived from public 
employment. 
Part of the labour force is unemployed ( t u ), while the remaining is either working in 
the public sector (
g
t L ) or in the private sector (
p
t L ), 
  1
gp
ttt uLL =++.  (2) 
Workers supply one unit of labour. If they are unemployed they search for jobs in 
both public and private sectors.  t s  gives the share of time devoted searching for a public 
sector job. Firms post vacancies 
p
t v .  The number of matches is determined by two matching 
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Government 
The government hires workers to provide some public services, following a simple 
linear function
g
tt gL = . As in Quadrini and Trigari (2007), we assume that both public sector 
employment and wages are set exogenously. It is not our purpose to identify the optimal level 
of public employment and wages, but simply to understand the transmission mechanism of 
public sector wages and employment shocks.  
  ,
gggg
tt LLww == .  (6) 
Although the government targets the level of public employment, it has to post a 
number of vacancies consistent with the following law of motion. 
  1 (1)
ggggg
tttt LLqv l + =-+ .  (7) 
Every period a fraction 
g l  of public jobs are destroyed so the government posts the 
number of public sector vacancies (
g
t v ) needed to maintain the level of employment, given 
the current market conditions. 
Finally, the government sets a labour income tax ( t t ) necessary to finance the 
government wage bill, the payment of unemployment benefits ( z ) and the cost of posting the 
vacancies (
g c ), 
  (1)
ppgggg
tttttttt LwLwzucv tt =-++ .  (8) 
 
Firms 




a - = .  (9) 
The private sector labour follows the following law of motion 
  1 (1)
ppppp
tttt LLqv l + =-+ ,  (10)   9 
where 
p l  is the private sector job separation rate. At any point in time the level of 
employment is predetermined and the firm can only control the number of vacancies it posts. 
The objective of the firms is therefore to maximize the present discounted value of profits 














-- ￿ ,  (11) 
where 
p c is the cost of posting a vacancy. The solution to this problem is given by the 















=--+- .  (12) 
The optimality condition of the firm states that the expected cost of hiring a worker 
must equal its expected return. The benefits of hiring an extra worker is the discounted value 
of the expected difference between its marginal productivity and its wage and the 
continuation value, knowing that with some probability 
p l  the match can be destroyed. 
 
Workers 
The value to the household of each member depends on their current state: employed 
in the public or in the private sector or unemployed. The value of being in each state is given 
by the following expressions: 
  11 (1)[(1)]
ppppp
tttttt WwEWU tbll ++ =-+-+,  (13) 
  11 (1)[(1)]
ggggg
tttttt WwEWU tbll ++ =-+-+,  (14) 
  111 [(1)]
pppggpg
ttttttttt UzEpWpWppU b +++ =+++-- .  (15) 
The value of unemployment depends on the level of unemployment benefits and on 
the probabilities of finding a job in the two sectors. As the unemployed control the search 
effort into each sector, they can affect both probabilities. Therefore, they will choose how to   10 
split their search optimally, by maximizing the value of unemployment. The optimal search of 












.  (16) 
The optimal search of public sector jobs increases with the number of vacancies in the 
public sector and the value of a public job, which depends positively on the public sector 
wage and negatively on the separation probability. It is increasing in the importance of 
unemployment  and  in the government matching function, and decreasing in the same 
coefficient of the private sector matching function. 
 
Wage bargaining 
We consider that the private sector wage is the outcome of a Nash bargaining between 
workers and firms. The solution is given by 
  (1)()
p
ttt bWUbJ --=,  (17) 
where  b is the bargaining power of the worker and  t J  is the value of an average job for the 
firm, given by the following expression 







bl+ =-+- .  (18) 
 
2.2. Calibration and simulation 
We calibrate the model to be, in general, representative on an OECD economy. Table 
1 shows the baseline calibration. We consider public employment to be 15% of total labour 
force, which, given an average unemployment rate of 8% is equivalent to, roughly, 16% of 
total employment. The public sector wage is set such that in steady state the public sector   11 
wage premium is equal to 5%. This value is in line with several empirical estimates (see 
Gregory and Borland, 1999, for an overview of the literature.  
[Table 1] 
The separation rate in the public sector is set to 3%, half the separation rate in the 
private sector (6%). This follows Gomes (2008) that finds evidence of this for UK. We also 
calibrate the two matching functions differently. As it is usual in the literature, we set 
p h  
equal to 0.5. In contrast, 
g h  is set equal to 0.3, which implies that vacancies are relatively 
more important than the pool of unemployed in the public sector. We believe that this is a less 
extreme assumption than the one used by Quadrini & Trigari (2007). They consider that the 
unemployed queue for a public sector job which means that all public vacancies are filled.
3 
The other frictions parameters (
i c and 
i m ) are set equal in both sectors. Overall, the 
calibration implies an unemployment rate of 8%, a job finding rate of 0.63 between the two 
sectors, and a probability of filling a vacancy in the private sector of 0.5 and of 0.8 in the 
public sector.  
Following also the search and matching literature, the coefficient of the private wage 
bargaining is set to 0.5.  Finally, the unemployment benefit is set to 0.3, which implies a 
replacement rate around 0.4, the discount factor is set to 0.99 and a to 0.3.  
We can see in Figure 1 that the steady state level of private sector wages is positively 




In essence, public sector wages and employment impinge on private sector wage, via 
two channels. First, they affect the outside option of the unemployed, either by increasing the 
                                                 
3 In practice, the way that we calibrate the matching function is not important. The government decision variable 
is the level of public employment and vacancies adjust to guarantee that the new hires compensate the 
separations. 
4 In the Appendix we report the behaviour of the other variables in the model.   12 
value of being employed in the public sector (public sector wage) or by increasing the 
probability of being hired by the public sector (public sector employment). Therefore, they 
put pressure on the wage bargaining. Second, both public wages and employment have to be 
financed by an increase in taxes, which will reduce the overall gain from the match and 
increase the wage paid by the firm. On average, an increase of 1% in public sector wages 
induces an increase of 0.1% in private sector wage. An increase in public employment of 1% 
of the labour force increases private sector wage by 0.45%. 
 
Effects of temporary shocks in public sector employment and wages 
We will now consider shocks to the level of public sector wages and employment of 
the following type: 
  ln()ln(), ~(1)
gg
ttt wwAR ee =+ ,  (19) 
  ln()ln(), ~(1)
gg
ttt LLAR mm =+ ,  (20) 
with an autoregressive coefficient of the error of 0.8. 
Figure 2 shows the response of  public and private sector wages to a public sector 
wage shock. We consider three cases with different levels of steady state public employment 
( 0.10
g L = , 0.15
g L =  and 0.20
g L = ). A temporary increase in public sector wage raises the 
level of the private sector wage, but the magnitude of the response is, however, lower than if 
the shock was permanent. A 1% increase in public sector wages increase private sector wages 
by between 0.03% and 0.05%, depending on the size of the public sector. The bigger the size 
of the government, the higher the effect of public sector wages on the labour market. 
[Figure 2] 
 
Figure 3 shows the response of private sector wages to a temporary increase of public 
sector employment of 6.67% (corresponding to an increase from 0.15 to 0.16). We also   13 
consider three alternative scenarios for the level of public sector wages (with low public 
sector wages ( /1.00
gp ww = ), the baseline case ( /1.05
gp ww = ) and one with higher public 
sector wages ( /1.10
gp ww = ). The impact on private sector wage occurs at the time of hiring, 
and that is why the impact on the private sector wage is not very persistent. After two periods 
it is close to zero. Nevertheless the contemporaneous effect is quite strong. Private sector 
wages go up between 3% and 7%. 
[Figure 3] 
 
3. Empirical framework  
In this section, we estimate the determinants of both private sector and public sector 
wages. Our underlying idea is to estimate two different wage functions which link private and 
public wages together, carefully addressing the problem of the endogeneity between the two.  
Most papers that study the relation between the two wage variables usually focus on 
wages per employee in levels (see, for instance, Nunziata, 2005, Jacobson and Ohlsson, 1994 
and Friberg, 2007). However, we prefer to model growth rates, to assess the behaviour of the 
two variables in the short-run. Since we have annual data, using growth rates eliminates the 
low frequency movements but preserves the movements at business cycle frequency, which 
we are more interested in uncovering (see Abraham and Haltiwanger, 1995). 
In the long-run it is natural that the two variables are cointegrated with a slope 
coefficient of one, otherwise, one would observe a constant divergence of the wages of the 
two sectors. Notice that this does not exclude that there are differences in the levels of the 
wages, but essentially that these differences do not have a trend. In fact, we observe and we 
should expect either a public sector wage premium or a gap to exist, due to different skill 
composition of employment or barriers between the two sectors.    14 
We study this issue in a panel framework for OECD and European  Union country 
groups, covering essentially the period between 1970 and 2007, depending also on data 
availability.  
 
3.1. Empirical specification for private sector wages 
Our general baseline wage function for the developments in private sector salaries can 
be given by  
  11
pp
itipitititpitit wpwpXZE bdgm -- =+++++ .  (21) 
In (21) the index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates the 
period, bi stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i, and it is assumed 
that the disturbances  it m  are independent across countries. wpit is the growth rate of the 
nominal compensation per employee in the private sector.
p
it X is a vector of  macroeconomic 
variables that might be endogenous to the private sector wage growth: 
  12345678
p
ititititititititit Xwgplhtotutweg qqqqqqqq =+++++++.(22) 
This vector
p
it X includes the growth rate of real compensation per employee in the 
public sector, wgit, the growth rate of the consumer price index, p, the growth rate of labour 
productivity,  l (or total factor productivity), the change in the unemployment rate, u, the 
growth rate of the per worker average hours worked, h, tot denotes the growth rate of the 
countries terms of trade, tw is the change in the tax wedge, while the growth rate of public 
employment,  eg, which can also positively impinge on the growth rate of private sector 
wages, if higher labour demand in the public sector pressures private sector wages upward. 
On the other hand, 
p
it Z  is a vector of institutional exogenous variables 
  12345
g
itititititit Zudbcbdbrrcbi ppppp =++++,   (23)   15 
which includes the change in union density, ud, an index of bargaining coordination, bc, the 
change in benefit duration, bd, the change in the benefit replacement ratio, brr and previous 
work by  Nunziata (2005) concluded that these institutional variables were important 
determinants of the level of wages. While union density should contribute to increase wages, 
the benefit replacement rate and duration all affect the outside option of the worker, and 
therefore may also influence their wage. Additionally if the bargaining process is centrally 
coordinated it is likely to restrain private sector wage growth. We also include an index of 
central bank independence, cbi, to capture potential inflation expectations.  
Finally, 1 it E -  in ( 21) is defined as the percentage difference between public and 
private sector wages – the public wage premium or gap: 
  111 ln(/)100 ittt EWgWp --- =· ,   (24) 
where Wg and Wp are respectively the nominal public and private wage levels per employee. 
This term can be interpreted as an error correction mechanism. In this sense, if private and 
public sector wages start diverging, p g , in  equation  (21), measures whether part of the re-
balancing is done via the private sector wages. 
There are two ways via which public sector wages can affect private sector wages. 
There is the direct effect, 1 q , and there is the indirect effect through the error correction 
mechanism of magnitude p g . If the ratio of public-to-private wages increases, private sector 
wages may raise in order to correct the wage differential downwards. This can be seen both as 
a demonstration effect stemming from the public sector, followed by the private sector, and as 
well as a catching up effect in salaries demanded (implemented) by (in) the private sector. 
Therefore,  p g  is expected to be positive. 
Additionally, in a specification such as (21)-(22), and according to the estimated value 
for 6 q , one can assess the cyclicality of private wages. Indeed, if  6 q  is negative this would   16 
imply a pro-cyclical behaviour of private wages towards unemployment, and a positive  6 q  
implies a counter-cyclical response of wages to unemployment. While the idea of wage 
counter-cyclicality was already put forward notably by Keynes (1939), empirical results 
actually produce evidence of both cyclical and counter cyclical private sector behaviour. 
Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) offer several arguments for the possibility of both 
outcomes. 
This specification for the private sector wage growth is inspired by the theoretical 
model, but with a few differences. First, given that there is long-run growth, which was 
absent from the model, we estimate the equation in  growth rates and include  the error 
correction term. Second, we include several variables that were absent from the model. 
 
3.2. Empirical specification for public sector wages 
We also estimate an equation for the public sector wage growth. This equation has 
somewhat  less motivation from the theoretical part, given that we consider public sector 
wages as exogenous. The baseline  wage function for the developments of public sector 
salaries can be assessed with the following specification  
  11
gg




ititititititit Xwppltotutw dddddd =+++++ ,  (26) 
  1234
g
ititititit Zudbcbdbrr hhhh =+++,   (27) 
  12 ititit FBudBalDebt ww =+ ,  (28) 
  12 ititit PElectionLeft ll =+ .  (29) 
We consider that the government wage can respond to the same variables as the 
private wages except for the average hour worked per worker, central bank independence and   17 
growth rate of public employment. Indeed, the hours worked in the public sector are more 
standardized than in the private sector, and the variable average hours per worker is likely to 
be also more relevant for the private sector. Additionally,  it F  includes fiscal variables such as 
the general government budget balance as a percentage of GDP and the general government 
debt-to-GDP ratio.  it P  contains the political variables, which consist of the percentage of 
votes for left wing parties and a dummy variable for parliamentary election years. While the 
variables in  it F  are endogenous, we consider the variables in it P  as exogenous. ai stands for 
the individual effects to be estimated for each country i.  
Similarly to the specification for the private sector wages,  g g now measures to what 
extent public wages correct the imbalances of the long-term relation between public sector 
and private sector wages. In this case, increases in the public wages-to-private wages ratio 
can produce afterwards a reduction in public sector wages, implying an expected negative 
value for g g .  
While one would e xpect that recent fiscal developments may impinge on the 
development of the public sector wages per employee, this hypothesis is seen as less relevant 
for the development of private sector wages. On the other hand, if one expects the 
unemployment rate to impinge negatively on the development of private sector wages, this 
effect may essentially be more mitigated or even absent in the case of public sector wages, 
given the higher rigidity of the labour force in the government sector (and a possible higher 
degree of unionisation). Finally, one should be aware that this aggregate analysis does not 
directly take into account such issues as labour flows between the two sectors or within the 
private sector, while different wage scales also co-exist inside the private sector, with 
different productivity and price developments. 
   18 
3.2. Econometric issues 
There are two main econometric issues when estimating the wage functions (21) and 
(25). The first issue is the presence of endogenous variables, particularly the simultaneous 
determination of public and private sector wage growth. To deal with this, we estimate each 
equation separately and instrument all the endogenous variables by the remaining pre-
determined variables and three lags of all variables. We compute the Sargan over-identifying 
test to access the validity of the instruments.  As we are using the lagged variables as 
instruments, essentially what we are doing is predicting the value of the regressors based on 
past information, so the interpretation of the coefficients should be, for instance, the effect of 
expected public sector wage growth on the growth rate of private sector wages. 
Although our distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables might seem 
arbitrary, we also run a Hausman test in some of the estimations to examine the exogeneity of 
each block of variables. 
The second issue is that, as we allow for a country specific error and include a lagged 
dependent variable, our specification has a correlation between a regressor and the error term. 
Although we also use the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator, our preferred methodology is a 
simple panel 2SLS estimation. First, the Arellano and Bond methodology implies estimating 
the equation in first differences (of growth rates) which inserts a lot of noise in the estimates. 
Furthermore, as Nickell et al. (2005) point out, the bias created by the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable in panel data, tends to zero if we have a long time series component. As 
we have close to 30 average time observations per country, we proceed with the estimation 
with a panel 2SLS. We also include country fixed effects, and we estimate the equations for 
both nominal and real wage growth. 
 
   19 
4. Estimation results and discussion 
4.1. Data and stylised facts 
Our main data source is the OECD Economic Outlook database, essentially for the 
employment and wages data, the European Commission database AMECO and the Labour 
Market Institutions Database  used in Nickell  et al. ( 2005) and expanded by Baker et al. 
(2003).
5 Private sector wages  are  defined as total compensation of employees minus 
compensation of  government employees. Private sector wages per employee are defined as 
private compensation of employees divided by private sector employees (total employment 
minus government employees minus self-employed persons).
6  We compute the real wage per 
employee  using the consumption price deflator.  Although we think it is useful to use 
aggregate data to study the issues at hand, we should be aware of its limitations. The main 
problem is that it ignores the composition of public and private employment, in particular 
with respect to the skill level of the employment. 
A cursory look at the main data series provides a first useful insight regarding past 
trends. The charts that we report in Appendix 3, regarding salaries and employment shares, 
show that while the share of government employment in total employment increased for most 
countries in the 1980s, there was an even more generalised decline after the beginning of the 
1990s. 
Regarding real  wage  per  employee  an upward trend can be observed for most 
countries, both for private and for government salaries. Nevertheless, a decline in real private 
wages per employee was visible for Italy and Spain since the middle of the 1990s, which also 
needs to be seen against the increase in female labour participation. Interestingly, real public 
wages per employee were rather stable for Japan, Germany and Austria since the beginning of 
                                                 
5 Given data availability, the countries used in the empirical analysis are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
United States. See Appendix 1 for further details and sources. 
6 This approach is also used by Lamo et al. (2007).   20 
the 1990s. The mean and the volatility of private wage growth, reported in Appendix 2, were 
rather similar to the ones of public wage growth 
A further stylised fact is given by the development of the ratio of public-to-private 
wages per employee, which broadly  followed an upward path since the beginning of the 
1990s for most European countries. However, such ratio was more stable in the Netherlands, 
and to some extent in Sweden, while developments were more mixed for the US and Norway. 
On the other hand, the ratio of public-to-private wages per employee decreased in Canada and 
in Australia. 
 
4.2. Private wage determinants 
Table 2 reports the results for the growth rate of the nominal private sector wages per 
employee, for the OECD countries. The estimated coefficients are quite similar across the 
estimation method. In the case of nominal private sector wages we should focus more on the 
results from 2SLS as the GMM estimators does not pass the Sargan test. 
One can observe that both the direct effect and the indirect effect – via the ratio 
between public wages and private wages – of public sector wages are statistically significant 
and positive, as expected. A 1% increase in real public sector wage growth increases private 
sector nominal wage growth by 0.3%. 
[Table 2] 
 
The growth rate of public employment also has a positive and significant effect on the 
growth rate of nominal private sector wages. A 1 percent in public sector employment 
increases private sector wage growth by close to 0.3%. 
The change in the unemployment rate exerts a negative effect on private sector wage 
growth,  in other w ords,  a pro-cyclical behaviour.  A 1 percentage point  increase in the   21 
unemployment rate reduces the growth rate of nominal private sector wages by around 0.3-
0.6 percentage points. On the other hand, private sector wages increase with total factor 
productivity growth (labour productivity  was  not statistically significant).  Moreover, an 
increase in the inflation rate of 1 percentage point translates into an increase in the growth 
rate of nominal private sector wages of around 0.8 percentage points. Some wage stickiness is 
captured by the statistically significant lagged dependent variable. There are no statistically 
significant effects reported for the terms of trade, for the hours worked per worker or for the 
tax wedge.  
Regarding the set of pre-determined explanatory variables (in vector  Z), it is 
interesting to see that the growth rate of nominal private sector wages is positively affected by 
the degree of union density, implying that  an increase in  unionisation may translate into 
higher private wage growth.  Higher central bank independence has  an  opposite effect, 
therefore contributing to reduce the growth rate of  nominal private sector  wages.  Benefit 
duration, and the benefit replacement rate do not statistically affect the growth rate of nominal 
private sector wages.  
To further assess our results, we also report the estimations for the specification 
regarding the growth rate of real private sector wages per employee in Table 3.  Both 




We can see that in this case, the lagged value of the dependent variable is  still 
statistically significant, while the growth rate of average hours per worker now contributes to 
increase the growth rate of real private sector wage per employee. Another difference that 
emerges is the fact that the inflation rate does not affect the growth rate of real private sector   22 
wages per employee.
7 The statistical significance and the estimated coefficients of the 
remaining explanatory variables are rather similar to the specification for the growth rate of 
nominal private sector wages, notably the indirect effect of public wages via the error 
correction component. 
In the estimations, for both nominal and real private sector wage growth, the Hausman 
test clearly supports that the institutional variables block is exogenous and that the variables 
in the macroeconomic block are endogenous. 
 
4.3. Public wage determinants 
We now turn to the analysis of the determinants of public sector wages, and the 
corresponding estimation results  for nominal wages  are presented in Table  4.  All the 
estimations pass the Sargan test. 
 [Table 4] 
 
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant, denoting some degree of 
public sector wage stickiness. The growth rate of nominal public sector wages per employee 
also reacts positively to real private sector wages, with a coefficient between 0.5 and 0.9. It 
also responds negatively to an increase in the ratio between public and private sector wages. 
Therefore, this correction mechanism adjusts public wages downward when the differential 
vis-à-vis private wages rises. Note that the absolute value of the coefficient is roughly three 
times higher than the one from the similar error correction component’s coefficient estimated 
in the private sector model. This means that three quarters of the adjustment is done via 
public sector wages. 
                                                 
7 Such result could be read in this case as an indication of monetary neutrality.   23 
An increase in the inflation rate also increases the growth rate of nominal public 
sector wages and the magnitude of this effect is around 0.6 percentage points. Total factor 
productivity is negatively related to the growth rate of nominal public sector wages, and this 
can be explained by the fact that the productivity measure pertains essentially to the private 
sector. The terms of trade do not statistically affect the growth rate of nominal public sector 
wages. 
Regarding the two explanatory fiscal variables, improvements in the budget balance 
increase the growth rate of nominal public sector wages, while a higher government debt-to-
GDP ratio reduces it. An increase in the budget balance ratio of 1 percentage point translates 
into an increase of the growth rate of nominal public sector wages of around 0.1 percentage 
points.  Interestingly, in the GMM estimations, higher government indebtedness is related 
with decreases in the growth rate of nominal public sector wages. In terms of the pre-
determined exogenous variables it is  not  possible to  observe  any  statistically significant 
negative effect associated either with bargaining coordination or with benefits duration, and 
the same is true for the political dummy variables. 
When using the growth rate of real public sector wages per employee as dependent 
variable (Table 5), the inflation rate has a negative impact.  This suggests that, unlike the 
private sector, the public sector wages are more able to contain the repercussion of expected 
inflation on the public sector wage growth.  On the other hand, real public wages react 
positively to increases in the unemployment rate.  The effects of the other explanatory 
variables still hold, and improvements in the budget balance notably contribute to increase 
real public wages per employee.  
[Table 5] 
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We also considered only the subset of European Union and euro area countries in our 
empirical analysis (see Appendix 2). The results are rather similar to the ones for the OECD 
country sample. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effect of the budget balance on public 
wages is now slightly higher. 
 
4.4. Robustness, including further dynamics 
In our baseline estimations, the only dynamic element is the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable. Even if that coefficient is small one could argue that there might be direct 
effects of past explanatory variables on the regressors. Therefore, w e included  in the 
regressions one lag of all explanatory variables. Most lags of the variables are not significant. 
As we are interested on the overall effect of a variable on the wage growth, in  Table 6 we 
only report the sum of the two coefficients (contemporaneous and lagged) and the p-value of 
the test that the sum of the two coefficients is different from zero. Basically, the main results 
from the baseline specification remain: notably, there is a spillover of both private and public 
wages, through the direct effect and via the error correction mechanism, as well as the effect 
of public employment on private wages. 
[Table 6] 
 
In addition, it seems that the inclusion of lags do not carry much explanatory power in 
this case. Indeed, the R -square changes very little, and the test that all coefficients of the 
lagged explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is accepted for the 2SLS case of public 
sector wages. Consequently, there isn’t much gain from the inclusion of the above mentioned 
lags,  which  just  increases  the standard deviations and reduces the significance of some 
variables. 
   25 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to uncover the determinants of public and private sector 
wage growth. We also find that a number of variables affect private sector wage growth, for 
instance: unemployment rate (negative relationship), inflation rate, total factor productivity, 
and  hours per worker. More important, public sector wages  and employment  also affect 
private sector wage growth. In terms of magnitude, the estimated values are higher than the 
values suggested by the model. The empirical estimates show a contemporaneous effect of 
around 0.3% private sector wages with respect to public sector wages. Higher public sector 
wages might translate into higher demand, increasing the pressure on the private sector labour 
market. Similarly, public sector wage growth may also carry a signal to the private sector on 
what the government expects for inflation. 
This finding has important policy implications.  It gives strength to the “wage twist” 
policy discussed by Pedersen et al. (1990). Therefore, the governments could use their role as 
an employer to reduce relative public sector wages. This policy, besides reducing the tax 
burden  necessary to finance government spending,   would have a  downward  impact on 
private sector wages and, most likely, on inflation and unemployment.  
Regarding the public sector wages, statistically significant determinants are private 
sector wages, inflation, and the unemployment rate (positive relationship). Moreover, public 
sector wages react positively to the budget balance and negatively to government 
indebtedness. Political variables, however, do not seem to play an important role     
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Table 1 – Baseline calibration 
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Table 2 – Nominal private wages per employee 
  2SLS  GMM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.594***  -0.638***  -0.345***  -0.314***  ? Unemployment rate 
(-3.45)  (-4)  (-4.77)  (-4.41) 
0.250*  0.293**  0.275***  0.311***  Total factor productivity 
growth  (1.65)  (2.17)  (3.75)  (4.47) 
0.762***  0.768***  0.777***  0.785***  Inflation rate 
(10.47)  (11.02)  (14.19)  (14.59) 
0.379***  0.377***  0.285***  0.289***  Growth rate of real public 
sector wages  (5.78)  (6.19)  (4.36)  (4.48) 
-0.031    0.002    Growth rate of terms of 
trade  (-0.72)    (0.1)   
1.936    1.013    Growth rate of average 
hours per worker  (0.86)    (1.23)   
0.052    0.044   
? Tax wedge 
(0.44)    (0.88)   
0.297**  0.283***  0.339***  0.345***  Growth rate of public 
employment  (2.57)  (2.63)  (5.34)  (5.21) 
0.130**  0.127**  0.107*  0.105*  Lagged dependent 
Variable  (2.28)  (2.34)  (1.86)  (1.82) 
0.044***  0.042***  0.035**  0.032**  Error correction 
component  (3.04)  (3.02)  (2.45)  (2.19) 
0.211**  0.221**  0.198    ? Union density 
(1.97)  (2.18)  (1.55)   
0.087    -0.122    Bargaining Coordination 
(0.23)    (-0.28)   
-1.484    -0.067    ? Benefit duration 
(-0.47)    (-0.02)   
0.914    0.112    ? Benefit replacement rate
(0.26)    (0.04)   
-2.668***  -2.656***  -2.412***  -2.405***  Central bank 
independence  (-2.98)  (-3.07)  (-3)  (-3.43) 
R
2  0.875  0.874  0.882  0.881 
Sargan test 
#  57.2 (0.171)  58.7 (0.371)  443.9 (0.004)  445.2 (0.006) 
Overidentifying restrictions  48  56  368  374 
Hausman Test
& 
(Exogenous)  6.75 (0.944)  1.65 (0.996)     
Hausman Test
$ 
(Endogenous)  31.53 (0.008)  21.81 (0.010)     
Observations  382  382  382  382 
Countries  16  16  16  16 
 
Notes: The following variables are considered endogenous: change in unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation 
rate, growth rate of real per worker public sector wages, growth rate of terms of trade, growth rate of hours per worker, change in tax wedge 
and the growth rate of public employment. These endogenous variables are instrumented by the remaining pre-determined variables and 
three lags of all explanatory variables. The t statistics are in parentheses. For the 2SLS estimation, the conventional standard errors were 
used. For the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator robust standard errors were used.. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent.
. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
# The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under 
the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is in brackets. 
& The null 
hypothesis is that the block of institutional variables is exogenous. Under the null, the estimator used is efficient but is is inconsistent under 
the alternative hypothesis. The consistent estimator would be to consider all variables as endogenous and instrument them with lags. The p-
value is in brackets.  
$ The null hypothesis is that the block of macroeconomic variables is exogenous. Under the null, the most efficient 
estimator is fixed effects estimation taking all variables as exogenous. Under the alternative hypothesis the estimates are consistent 
estimates. The p-value is in brackets.   
Countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
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Table 3 – Real private wages per employee 
  2SLS  GMM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.430**  -0.344**  -0.228**  -0.233***  ? Unemployment rate 
(-2.46)  (-2.48)  (-2.48)  (-2.61) 
0.15    0.251***  0.263***  Total factor productivity 
growth  (1.02)    (3.51)  (4.04) 
0.013    -0.034    Inflation rate 
(0.3)    (-1.53)   
0.357***  0.346***  0.308***  0.321***  Growth rate of real public 
sector wages  (5.43)  (5.78)  (4.96)  (5.17) 
0.007    0.025    Growth rate of terms of 
trade  (0.14)    (1.13)   
3.939*  4.884***  1.739**  1.978**  Growth rate of average 
hours per worker  (1.72)  (2.6)  (2.19)  (2.28) 
-0.013    0.036   
? Tax wedge 
(-0.11)    (0.65)   
0.249**  0.257***  0.334***  0.308***  Growth rate of public 
employment  (2.2)  (3.29)  (5.83)  (5.3) 
0.130**  0.137***  0.163***  0.152***  Lagged dependent 
Variable  (2.34)  (2.82)  (3.14)  (3.31) 
0.042***  0.044***  0.030*  0.031**  Error correction 
component  (2.95)  (3.39)  (1.91)  (2.07) 
0.170  0.174*  0.147    ? Union density 
(1.62)  (1.74)  (1.27)   
-0.084    -0.217    Bargaining Coordination 
(-0.23)    (-0.46)   
-1.088    -0.897    ? Benefit duration 
(-0.35)    (-0.27)   
1.384    -0.173    ? Benefit replacement rate
(0.4)    (-0.06)   
-2.378***  -2.550***  -2.058***  -1.937***  Central bank 
independence  (-2.72)  (-3.07)  (-2.86)  (-2.71) 
R
2  0.355  0.338  0.381  0.368 
Sargan test 
#  51.9 (0.290)  52.2 (0.543)  387.2 (0.223)  401.1 (0.161) 
Overidentifying restrictions  47  56  367  374 
Hausman Test
& 
(Exogenous)  5.65 (0.975)  0.38 (1.000)     
Hausman Test
$ 
(Endogenous)  22.27 (0.101)  17.50 (0.025)     
Observations  382  382  382  382 
Countries  16  16  16  16 
 
Notes: The following variables are considered endogenous: change in unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation 
rate, growth rate of real per worker public sector wages, growth rate of terms of trade, growth rate of hours per worker, change in tax wedge 
and the growth rate of public employment. These endogenous variables are instrumented by the remaining pre-determined variables and 
three lags of all explanatory variables. The t statistics are in parentheses. For the 2SLS estimation, the conventional standard errors were 
used. For the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator robust standard errors were used.. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent.
. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
# The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under 
the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is in brackets. . 
& The null 
hypothesis is that the block of institutional variables is exogenous. Under the null, the estimator used is efficient but it is inconsistent under 
the alternative hypothesis. The consistent estimator would be to consider all variables as endogenous and instrument them with lags. The p-
value is in brackets.  
$ The null hypothesis is that the block of macroeconomic variables is exogenous. Under the null, the most efficient 
estimator is fixed effects estimation taking all variables as exogenous. Under the alternative hypothesis the estimates are consistent 
estimates. The p-value is in brackets.   
Countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and United States. Time span: 1974-1998. 
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  Table 4 – Nominal public wages per employee   
  2SLS  GMM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.485**  0.472**  0.009    ? Unemployment rate 
(1.96)  (2.13)  (0.06)   
-0.394**  -0.388**  -0.124    Total factor productivity 
growth  (-2.02)  (-2.04)  (-1.09)   
0.569***  0.570***  0.574***  0.576***  Inflation rate 
(7.43)  (8.03)  (12.51)  (11.46) 
0.826***  0.880***  0.480***  0.475***  Growth rate of real private 
sector wages  (5.64)  (6.64)  (7.12)  (6.85) 
-0.055    0.011    Growth rate of terms of 
trade  (-0.88)    (0.51)   
-0.093    -0.048    ? Tax wedge 
  (-0.53)    (-0.6)   
0.135**  0.123*  0.123*  0.125**  Budget Balance  
(2.06)  (1.95)  (1.7)  (2.01) 
-0.016  -0.021  -0.029*  -0.030**  Government debt 
  (-1.09)  (-1.49)  (-1.76)  (-2.02) 
0.214***  0.222***  0.250***  0.253***  Lagged dependent 
Variable  (4.28)  (4.57)  (3.52)  (3.68) 
-0.108***  -0.114***  -0.106***  -0.113***  Error correction 
component  (-5.47)  (-5.95)  (-6.82)  (-6.56) 
0.077    0.239  0.201  ? Union density 
(0.49)    (1.57)  (1.29) 
-0.331    -0.447  0.000  Bargaining Coordination 
(-0.65)    (-0.69)   
-5.211    -4.633    ? Benefit duration 
(-1.12)    (-1.39)   
0.964    2.346    ? Benefit replacement rate
(0.2)    (0.53)   
-0.141    -0.139    Election year 
  (-0.47)    (-0.49)   
0.049    0.041    % Left wing votes 
(1.17)    (0.84)   
R
2  0.778  0.773  0.800  0.796 
Sargan test p-value 
#  52.02 (0.285)  54.7 (0.487)  393.5 (0.155)  406.6 (0.126) 
Overidentifying restrictions  47  55  366  375 
Hausman Test
& 
(Exogenous)  5.13 (0.995)  -     
Hausman Test
$ 
(Endogenous)  42.62 (0.000)  87.75 (0.000)     
Observations  382  382  382  382 
Countries  16  16  16  16 
 
Notes: The following variables are considered endogenous: change in unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation 
rate, growth rate of real per worker private sector wages, growth rate of terms of trade, growth rate of hours per worker, budget balance, 
government debt and tax wedge. These endogenous variables are instrumented by the remaining pre-determined variables and three lags of 
all explanatory variables. The t statistics are in parentheses. For the 2SLS estimation, the conventional standard errors were used. For the 
Arellano and Bond GMM estimator robust standard errors were used.. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
. White 
diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
# The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the 
test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is in brackets. . 
& The null hypothesis is 
that the block of institutional variables is exogenous. Under the null, the estimator used is efficient but it is inconsistent under the alternative 
hypothesis. The consistent estimator would be to consider all variables as endogenous and instrument them with lags. The p-value is in 
brackets.  
$ The null hypothesis is that the block of macroeconomic variables is exogenous. Under the null, the most efficient estimator is 
fixed effects estimation taking all variables as exogenous. Under the alternative hypothesis the estimates are consistent estimates. The p-
value is in brackets.   
Countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 





   31 
Table 5 – Real public wages per employee 
  2SLS  GMM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.658***  0.655***  0.166  0.202*  ? Unemployment rate 
(2.74)  (3.05)  (1.51)  (1.76) 
-0.377*  -0.361*  -0.113    Total factor productivity 
growth  (-1.94)  (-1.92)  (-1.07)   
-0.104  -0.130**  -0.126**  -0.119***  Inflation rate 
(-1.6)  (-2.26)  (-2.57)  (-2.66) 
0.765***  0.793***  0.514***  0.515***  Growth rate of real private 
sector wages  (5.26)  (6.03)  (8.36)  (8.25) 
0.015    0.048  0.052  Growth rate of terms of 
trade  (0.23)    (1.64)  (1.63) 
-0.175    -0.069    ? Tax wedge 
  (-0.96)    (-0.94)   
0.139**  0.136**  0.104  0.102  Budget Balance  
(2.14)  (2.22)  (1.45)  (1.63) 
-0.012  -0.018  -0.029*  -0.030**  Government debt 
  (-0.79)  (-1.3)  (-1.93)  (-2.12) 
0.209***  0.211***  0.241***  0.248***  Lagged dependent 
Variable  (4.29)  (4.65)  (4.03)  (3.91) 
-0.111***  -0.119***  -0.115***  -0.119***  Error correction 
component  (-5.68)  (-6.35)  (-7.33)  (-6.26) 
0.019    0.18    ? Union density 
(0.12)    (1.06)   
-0.614    -0.572    Bargaining Coordination 
(-1.22)    (-1)   
-4.316    -4.889**  -5.217**  ? Benefit duration 
(-0.93)    (-2.13)  (-2.25) 
0.853    1.708    ? Benefit replacement rate
(0.17)    (0.44)   
-0.327    -0.255    Election year 
  (-1.1)    (-0.87)   
0.034    0.025    % Left wing votes 
(0.81)    (0.55)   
R
2  0.388  0.381  0.427  0.415 
Sargan test p-value 
#  49.8 (0.325)  54.1 (0.471)  372.6 (0.395)  377.1 (0.431) 
Overidentifying restrictions  46  56  366  373 
Hausman Test
& 
(Exogenous)  4.57 (0.998)  -     
Hausman Test
$ 
(Endogenous)  50.60 (0.000)  44.2 (0.000)     
Observations  382  382  382  382 
Countries  16  16  16  16 
 
Notes: The following variables are considered endogenous: unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation rate, 
growth rate of real per worker private sector wages, terms of trade, hours per worker, budget balance, government debt and tax wedge. These 
endogenous variables are instrumented by the remaining pre-determined variables and three lags of all explanatory variables. The t statistics 
are in parentheses. For the 2SLS estimation, the conventional standard errors were used. For the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator robust 
standard errors were used. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. 
corrected). 
# The null hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the 
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the 
number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is in brackets. 
& The null hypothesis is that the block of institutional variables is 
exogenous. Under the null, the estimator used is efficient but it is inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis. The consistent estimator 
would be to consider all variables as endogenous and instrument them with lags. The p-value is in brackets.  
$ The null hypothesis is that the 
block of macroeconomic variables is exogenous. Under the null, the most efficient estimator is fixed effects estimation taking all variables as 
exogenous. Under the alternative hypothesis the estimates are consistent estimates. The p-value is in brackets.   
Countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 




   32 
Table 6 – Estimations with lags 
  Nominal Private  Real Private  Nominal Public  Real Public 
  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM 
-0.303  -0.386***  -0.210  -0.339**  1.144***  -0.070  1.169***  -0.061  ? Unemployment 
rate  (0.248)  (0.005)  (0.435)  (0.025)  (0.009)  (0.727)  (0.008)  (0.762) 
0.165  0.308***  0.055  0.271***  -0.356  -0.001  -0.397  -0.036  Total factor 
productivity growth  (0.312)  (0.000)  (0.548)  (0.000)  (0.411)  (0.647)  (0.365)  (0.759) 
0.716***  0.683***  -0.010  -0.019  0.483***  0.530***  -0.150  -0.083  Inflation rate 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.855)  (0.495)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.160)  (0.215) 
0.252***  0.198***  0.256***  0.212***           Growth rate of real 
public sector wages  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.004)         
        0.674***  0.447***  0.682***  0.472***  Growth rate of real 
private sector wages          (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
0.003  0.052*  -0.003  0.045  0.020  0.004  0.022  -0.003  Growth rate of terms 
of trade  (0.968)  (0.100)  (0.964)  (0.144)  (0.833)  (0.883)  (0.818)  (0.930) 
2.989  0.338  4.345  0.832           Growth rate of 
average hours per 
worker  (0.261)  (0.721)  (0.109)  (0.371)         
-0.156  -0.139**  -0.096  -0.068  -0.210  -0.079  -0.162  -0.032 
? Tax wedge 
(0.288)  (0.028)  (0.537)  (0.253)  (0.481)  (0.542)  (0.596)  (0.815) 
0.322**  0.286***  0.296**  0.280***           Growth rate of public 
employment  (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.028)  (0.000)         
        0.102  0.098  0.118  0.108  Budget Balance 
        (0.501)  (0.193)  (0.435)  (0.162) 
        -0.030  -0.024  -0.027  -0.018  Government debt 
        (0.163)  (0.159)  (0.231)  (0.293) 
0.176***  0.205***  0.163**  0.166***  0.272***  0.289***  0.253  0.264  Lagged dependent 
Variable  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.034**  0.027**  0.036**  0.025*  -0.118***  -0.108***  -0.121  -0.113  Error correction 
component  (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.026)  (0.089)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.152  0.201  0.161  0.190  -0.133  0.082  -0.138  0.043  ? Union density 
(0.285)  (0.132)  (0.263)  (0.147)  (0.541)  (0.675)  (0.530)  (0.833) 
-0.186  -0.304  -0.309  -0.447  -0.162  -0.414  -0.384  -0.603  Bargaining 
Coordination  (0.653)  (0.410)  (0.465)  (0.286)  (0.788)  (0.462)  (0.529)  (0.279) 
-1.270  -0.165  -2.904  -1.978  -2.078  -3.573  -3.496  -5.121*  ? Benefit duration 
(0.724)  (0.954)  (0.428)  (0.516)  (0.719)  (0.298)  (0.548)  (0.087) 
6.118  5.113  2.947  2.048  6.379  6.642  2.426  3.082  ? Benefit 
replacement rate  (0.144)  (0.288)  (0.493)  (0.642)  (0.339)  (0.100)  (0.721)  (0.489) 
-3.491***  -2.831***  -3.176  -2.532***           Central bank 
independence  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.000)         
        0.097  0.266  0.182  0.297  Election year 
        (0.870)  (0.623)  (0.760)  (0.598) 
            0.050  0.022  0.034  0.007  % Left wing votes 
        (0.327)  (0.706)  (0.509)  (0.910) 
R
2  0.889  0.895  0.388  0.371  0.770  0.809  0.359  0.449 







































38  354  38  354  35  352  39  352 
Observations  382  382  382  382  382  382  382  382 
Countries  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
Notes: Estimation included a lag of both endogenous and exogenous variables. The coefficient refers to the sum of the coefficients of the 
contemporaneous and lagged variable. In parenthesis is reported the p-value of the test that the sum of the coefficients is zero. For the lagged dependent 
variable and the error correction mechanism we present the p-value of the usual significance test. The following variables are considered endogenous: 
unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation rate, terms of trade, hours per worker, growth rate of government employment, 
budget balance, government debt, change in tax wedge, growth rate of real per worker public sector wages and growth rate of real per worker private 
sector. The contemporaneous endogenous variables are instrumented by the remaining pre-determined variables and three lags of all explanatory 
variables. For the 2SLS estimation, the conventional standard errors were used. For the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator robust standard errors were 
used. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
# The null hypothesis of 
the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from 
the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is in 
brackets. 
$The null hypothesis is that the coefficients of all lagged explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero. The p-value is in brackets.   
Countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and United States. Time span: 1974-1998.   33 
Figure 1 – Steady state effects of public sector employment and wages on private sector wages 
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Figure 2 – Response to a 1% increase in public sector wages 
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Note: All impulses are in percentage deviations from their steady-state value. Solid line corresponds to the case 
with  0.10
g L = , the dash line to the case with   0.15
g L =  and the dotted line to  0.20
g L = . 
 
 
Figure 3 – Response to a 1 percentage point increase in public sector employment 
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Appendix 1 – Summary statistics and sources 
Table A1 – Compensation of employees over total general government spending (%) 
  1995  2000  2005  2006  2007 
Belgium  22.9  23.5  23.2  24.4  24.1 
Bulgaria      24.6  24.4  23.9 
Czech Rep.  13.5  16.9  17.7  17.8  17.8 
Denmark  29.0  32.0  32.7  33.1  33.3 
Germany  18.1  17.9  16.0  15.9  15.8 
Estonia  27.0  29.9  27.8  26.7  25.1 
Ireland  24.6  25.3  27.2  28.4  27.5 
Greece  22.1  22.4  26.2  25.7  25.6 
Spain  25.2  26.3  26.0  26.0  26.1 
France  25.0  25.8  24.7  24.6  24.3 
Italy  20.9  22.6  22.9  22.1  22.2 
Cyprus    36.6  33.8  33.9  31.0 
Latvia  28.7  28.9  28.2  27.2  28.8 
Lithuania  27.9  31.1  30.9  30.9  29.6 
Luxemburg  21.3  20.1  18.9  18.9  19.0 
Hungary    22.5  25.2  23.5  22.6 
Malta  36.9  31.6  31.4  30.6  30.3 
Netherlands  20.5  21.5  21.6  20.5  20.0 
Austria  22.3  21.2  18.8  18.9  18.9 
Poland  22.3  24.6  23.2  22.4  22.5 
Portugal  30.2  32.9  30.3  29.4  28.2 
Romania    16.8  25.9  26.1  26.3 
Slovenia  21.6  24.2  25.5  25.3  25.3 
Slovakia  19.4  17.2  19.2  19.9  20.1 
Finland  24.6  26.9  27.4  27.4  27.5 
Sweden  24.6  27.3  28.5  28.3  29.0 
United Kingdom  24.1  26.4  25.5  25.5  25.2 
Euro Area 15    22.5  21.9  21.7  21.7 
European Union 27      23.0  22.8  22.8 
United States  28.5  28.4  28.3  28.0   
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Table A2 – Summary statistics and sources 
 
  Observations  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Source 
Growth rate of nominal 
private sector wages  382  7.12  4.97  -1.62  27.52  OECD 
Growth rate of real 
private sector wages  382  1.30  2.10  -7.46  9.40  OECD 
Growth rate of nominal 
public sector wages  382  6.82  5.26  -3.28  28.56  OECD 
Growth rate of real public 
sector wages 
382  1.00  3.09  -8.24  11.06  OECD 
Unemployment rate  382  7.45  3.81  1.38  19.11  OECD 
Total factor productivity 
growth rate  382  1.19  1.52  -3.39  6.69  OECD 
Inflation rate  382  6.11  4.79  0.02  23.23  OECD 
Terms of Trade  382  1.00  0.10  0.63  1.49  Labour Market Institutions 
Database 
Hours per worker  382  7.46  0.09  7.23  7.67  OECD 
Budget Balance  382  -3.30  4.40  -15.71  9.75  AMECO / IMF 
Government Debt  382  55.14  28.83  2.31  140.85  AMECO / IMF 
Growth rate of public 
employment  382  1.35  2.19  -5.76  9.47  OECD 
Tax wedge  382  0.52  0.12  0.24  0.83  Labour Market Institutions 
Database 
Union density  382  0.45  0.21  0.09  0.91  Labour Market Institutions 
Database 
Bargaining Coordination  382  2.06  0.62  1.00  3.00  Labour Market Institutions 
Database 
Benefit duration  382  0.43  0.31  0.00  1.02  Labour Market Institutions 
Database 
Central bank 
independence  382  0.50  0.18  0.22  0.93  Labour Market Institutions 
Database 
Election  382  0.31  0.46  0  1  Comparative parties dataset 
% Left wing votes  382  35.51  14.72  0  56  Comparative parties dataset 
 
Note: Labour Market Institutions Database (LMID) created by Nickell et al. (2005). Data was further expanded by Baker et al. 
(2003) - BHHS.  The comparatives party dataset was created by Duane Swank and it is available on 
 http://www.mu.edu/polisci/Swank.htm. 
 
Employment and wage variables 
 
The data on public employment and wages is taken from the OECD (Economic Outlook 
database). 
 
For most countries there is information on Government employment (EG). To calculate the 
per employee wage we divide Government final wage consumption expenditure (CGW) by 
Government employment. To get the wage in real terms we deflate it using the Private final 
consumption expenditure deflator (PCP). 
 
We also have the value for the Compensation of employees (WSSS) and Total employment 
(ET), which refers to the total economy. We define Private sector compensation as the total 
compensation of workers minus the government final wage consumption (WSSS-CGW).  We 
define the private employment (EP) as total employment minus government employment 
minus Self Employed (ES): EP=ET-EG-ES. The private sector nominal wage per employee is 
Private sector compensation divided by private sector employees. 
 
For the case of Australia, there is no information on government employment but there is on 
Private sector employment and  Compensation of private sector employees. In this case, 
Government employment is defined as Total employment minus Private sector employment   37 
and Compensation of public sector employees defined as  the value of  Compensation of 




Benefit replacement rate - Benefit entitlement before tax as a percentage of previous earnings 
before tax. Source: LMID, BHHS from 1995-1999. 
 
Benefit duration index. Source: LMID, BHHS from 1995-1999. 
 
Coordination index  - Captures the degree of consensus between actors in collective 
bargaining (1 low, 3 high). Source: LMID, BHHS from 1995-1999. 
 
Trade union density – Ratio of total reported union members (minus retired and unemployed) 
to all salaried employees. Source: LMID, BHHS from 1995-1999. 
 
Tax wedge – Payroll tax plus income tax plus the consumption tax rate. Source: LMID, 
BHHS from 1995-1999. 
 
Productivity growth  – Growth rate of productivity per worker. Source: OECD, own 
calculation. 
 
Terms of trade – Growth rate of terms of trade. Source: BHHS. 
 
Inflation – Source: OECD. 
 
Unemployment rate – Source: LMID, OECD from 1995-1999. 
 
Budget Balance  – Government balance as percentage of GDP. Source: AMECO, 
complemented with IMF data for early years. 
 
Government debt  – Government debt as percentage of GDP. Source: AMECO, 
complemented with IMF data for early years. 
 
Election year  – Dummy if there was a parliamentary of presidential election. Source: 
Comparative parties dataset. 
 












   38 
Appendix 2 – Further results 
 
Table A1 – Summary statistics (selected variables)  
 
  Growth rate of 
nominal private 
sector wages 
Growth rate of real 
private sector 
wages 
Growth rate of 
nominal public 
sector wages 




  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d. 
Australia  6.96  4.86  1.03  3.06  7.07  4.91  1.14  3.03  6.19  4.14 
Austria  5.36  3.49  1.92  1.94  5.29  2.96  1.84  1.76  3.70  2.30 
Belgium  5.57  7.13  1.59  6.61  2.84  2.81  -0.41  4.07  4.17  3.14 
Canada  5.81  3.44  1.21  1.96  4.82  4.13  0.21  2.08  4.76  3.36 
Denmark  5.70  5.70  1.08  4.57  5.69  3.46  0.92  2.39  5.21  3.86 
Finland  7.69  5.21  2.33  2.82  6.90  4.70  1.55  2.37  5.58  4.76 
France  6.55  4.89  1.60  1.64  6.66  4.88  1.71  2.12  5.14  4.22 
Germany  4.45  3.70  1.61  2.74  3.89  3.37  1.05  2.55  3.08  1.95 
Ireland  9.34  6.13  2.45  2.43  10.19  5.66  3.31  3.59  7.23  6.00 
Italy  9.35  6.90  1.59  2.69  9.34  6.52  1.57  3.66  7.84  6.02 
Japan  4.29  5.92  1.49  2.29  4.87  6.38  2.07  2.86  3.37  4.67 
Netherlands  4.93  4.02  1.27  2.11  3.42  3.37  -0.25  2.47  3.75  2.72 
Norway  6.09  2.77  1.45  1.74  5.82  2.65  1.18  2.01  5.29  3.59 
Spain  9.37  6.86  1.55  2.94  8.00  6.06  0.18  3.05  8.34  5.90 
Sweden  7.11  3.85  1.44  2.62  6.53  3.65  0.86  2.88  5.49  4.01 
United Kingdom  8.23  5.26  1.98  2.10  9.33  5.86  3.08  3.07  6.57  5.27 
United States  5.15  2.02  1.11  1.33  5.06  2.19  1.02  1.81  4.67  2.97 
All countries  6.60  5.27  1.57  2.94  6.27  4.95  1.26  2.90  5.33  4.44 
      S.d. – standard deviation. 
Table A2 – Summary statistics (selected variables) 
  Unemployment 




  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d.  Mean  S.d. 
Australia  6.41  2.29  0.73  1.30  1.09  0.10  7.49  0.02  23.10  4.12 
Austria  3.66  1.78  1.20  1.28  1.02  0.04  7.41  0.01  24.27  5.13 
Belgium  7.20  2.79  1.21  1.39  0.98  0.03  7.42  0.06  11.98  22.76 
Canada  8.21  1.83  0.69  1.39  0.98  0.06  7.49  0.03  4.84  11.96 
Denmark  5.20  2.16  1.14  1.33  1.01  0.07  7.38  0.06  4.37  10.03 
Finland  7.44  4.42  1.93  1.69  0.97  0.04  7.50  0.04  1.52  7.62 
France  7.22  2.61  1.05  0.98  0.98  0.07  7.46  0.08  -3.04  5.05 
Germany  5.18  2.76  1.03  0.76  0.95  0.06  7.39  0.09  19.46  10.07 
Ireland  10.08  4.66  2.27  2.02  1.08  0.07  7.56  0.09  17.13  14.83 
Italy  7.91  2.48  0.97  1.55  0.97  0.10  7.54  0.03  13.64  8.18 
Japan  2.88  1.20  1.21  1.63  0.99  0.19  7.60  0.08  9.56  7.37 
Netherlands  5.01  2.35  1.12  1.04  1.01  0.02  7.34  0.11  58.28  16.98 
Norway  3.23  1.43  1.57  1.33  1.27  0.20  7.34  0.07  -15.75  3.60 
Spain  12.39  4.18  0.95  1.27  0.86  0.13  7.50  0.07  40.46  17.86 
Sweden  3.86  2.14  1.11  1.41  1.04  0.07  7.37  0.03  -14.32  7.22 
United Kingdom  7.05  2.57  1.36  1.46  1.00  0.06  7.48  0.04  -26.94  14.21 
United States  6.13  1.37  1.05  1.27  1.07  0.13  7.46  0.02  5.23  4.69 
All countries  6.36  3.56  1.22  1.44  1.01  0.13  7.46  0.10  10.38  22.86 
      S.d. – standard deviation. 
 
   39 
Table A3 – Correlation between variables 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Growth rate of real 
private sector wages 
1  -  0.40  -0.15  0.17  0.04  0.09  0.05  0.06  0.22  0.12  -0.21 
Growth rate of real 
public sector wages 
2  0.39  -  -0.10  -0.04  -0.14  0.14  -0.03  -0.04  -0.24  0.16  0.00 
? Unemployment rate 
 
3  -0.14  -0.07  -  -0.03  0.32  -0.08  -0.21  -0.10  0.04  -0.32  -0.15 
Total factor productivity 
growth 
4  0.18  0.04  0.05  -  -0.12  -0.02  0.24  0.07  -0.12  -0.14  -0.02 
Inflation rate 
 
5  0.06  -0.02  0.28  -0.07  -  -0.29  -0.33  0.11  0.55  -0.06  -0.61 
Growth rate of terms of 
trade 
6  0.09  0.07  -0.09  -0.01  -0.23  -  0.14  0.01  -0.12  0.03  0.19 
Growth rate of average 
hours per worker 
7  0.02  -0.05  -0.17  0.18  -0.20  0.12  -  0.04  -0.25  -0.08  0.26 
? Tax wedge 
 
8  0.08  -0.01  -0.04  0.02  0.15  0.02  0.04  -  0.07  0.09  0.05 
Growth rate of public 
employment 
9  0.17  -0.22  -0.01  -0.13  0.47  -0.08  -0.21  0.11  -  -0.02  -0.46 
Budget Balance 
 
10  0.03  0.12  -0.20  -0.06  -0.16  0.00  -0.07  0.03  0.08  -  -0.06 
Government Debt 
 
11  -0.04  -0.02  -0.09  0.02  -0.32  0.12  0.10  0.00  -0.37  -0.48  - 
Note: the values below the diagonal are the overall correlation between the variables. The values above the diagonal are 
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Table A4 – Estimations for the European countries 
  Nominal Private  Real Private  Nominal Public  Real Public 
  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM 
-0.495***  -0.343***  -0.390**  -0.206*  0.464*  0.014  0.546**  0.14  ? Unemployment rate  (-2.7)  (-3.33)  (-2.07)  (-1.65)  (1.67)  (0.08)  (1.99)  (1.06) 
0.357**  0.253***  0.318**  0.251***  -0.464**  -0.155  -0.452**  -0.145  Total factor productivity 
growth  (2.4)  (3.28)  (2.17)  (2.86)  (-2.22)  (-1.1)  (-2.16)  (-1.19) 
0.721***  0.745***  0.031  -0.025  0.614***  0.591***  -0.097  -0.115**  Inflation rate 
(8.33)  (10.6)  (0.6)  (-0.8)  (6.85)  (11.95)  (-1.33)  (-2.4) 
0.349***  0.233***  0.346***  0.264***          Growth rate of real 
public sector wages  (4.95)  (4.78)  (4.93)  (6.1)         
        0.839***  0.491***  0.787***  0.532***  Growth rate of real 
private sector wages          (5.27)  (6.27)  (4.98)  (7.31) 
0.003  -0.017  0.042  0.039  -0.118  -0.024  -0.064  0.042  Growth rate of terms of 
trade  (0.06)  (-0.47)  (0.72)  (0.93)  (-1.34)  (-0.71)  (-0.71)  (0.85) 
3.330  1.024  5.391**  2.037**          Growth rate of average 
hours per worker  (1.49)  (1.23)  (2.36)  (2.45)         
-0.075  0.032  -0.124  0.016  -0.100  -0.046  -0.138  -0.079  ? Tax wedge 
(-0.62)  (0.61)  (-1.01)  (0.29)  (-0.53)  (-0.54)  (-0.72)  (-1.08) 
0.360***  0.279***  0.313**  0.280***          Growth rate of public 
employment  (2.75)  (3.7)  (2.42)  (4.14)         
        0.200***  0.157*  0.213***  0.151*  Budget Balance 
        (2.68)  (1.79)  (2.92)  (1.81) 
        -0.006  -0.027  0  -0.022  Government debt 
        (-0.32)  (-1.49)  (0.01)  (-1.33) 
0.187***  0.151***  0.185***  0.203***  0.175***  0.222**  0.171***  0.222***  Lagged dependent 
Variable  (2.84)  (2.63)  (2.91)  (5.73)  (2.87)  (2.54)  2.95  3.21 
0.040**  0.037***  0.040**  0.035**  -0.113***  -0.111***  -0.112***  -0.115***  Error correction 
component  (2.5)  (3.05)  (2.55)  (2.56)  (-4.85)  (-6.01)  (-4.87)  (-6.08) 
0.047  0.125  -0.004  0.061  0.244  0.296  0.205  0.238  ? Union density 
(0.39)  (1.09)  (-0.04)  (0.61)  (1.4)  (1.61)  (1.19)  (1.18) 
0.453  -0.028  0.412  0.007  -0.799  -0.671  -1.020*  -0.776  Bargaining 
Coordination  (1.02)  (-0.05)  (0.94)  (0.01)  (-1.34)  (-0.86)  (-1.73)  (-1.15) 
-3.992  -2.209  -3.122  -3.015  -2.166  -3.252  -1.487  -3.442*  ? Benefit duration 
(-1.19)  (-0.56)  (-0.95)  (-0.95)  (-0.42)  (-1.08)  (-0.29)  (-1.93) 
3.018  2.148  2.688  1.661  0.24  1.175  -0.732  0.38  ? Benefit replacement 
rate  (0.82)  (0.6)  (0.74)  (0.5)  (0.04)  (0.24)  (-0.13)  (0.09) 
-2.388***  -2.375***  -2.017**  -1.982***          Central bank 
independence  (-2.58)  (-3.01)  (-2.21)  (-2.71)         
        -0.139  -0.141  -0.32  -0.297  Election year 
        -0.36  -0.37  -0.84  -0.77 
        0.056  0.045  0.032  0.023  % Left wing votes 
        0.99  0.81  0.56  0.46 
R
2  0.879  0.891  0.335  0.371  0.770  0.790  0.399  0.431 
























(0.926)    4.47 
(0.996)    3.06 
(0.999)    3.22 





(0.002)    28.48 
(0.019)    50.40 
(0.000)    63.03 
(0.000)   
Observations  282  282  282  282  282  282  282  282 
Countries  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
Notes: The following variables are considered endogenous: unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation rate, terms 
of trade, hours per worker, growth rate of government employment, budget balance, government debt, change in tax wedge, growth rate of 
real per worker public sector wages and growth rate of real per worker private sector. These endogenous variables are instrumented by the 
remaining pre-determined variables and three lags of all explanatory variables. The t statistics are in parentheses. For the 2SLS estimation, 
the conventional standard errors were used. For the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator robust standard errors were used. *, **, *** - 
statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
# The null hypothesis of the 
Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying 
restrictions. The p-value is in brackets. . 
& The null hypothesis is that the block of institutional variables is exogenous. Under the null, the 
estimator used is efficient but they are inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis. The consistent estimator would be to consider all 
variables as endogenous and instrument them with lags. The p-value is in brackets.  
$ The null hypothesis is that the block of macroeconomic 
variables is exogenous. Under the null, the most efficient estimator is fixed effects estimation taking all variables as exogenous. Under the 
alternative hypothesis the estimates are consistent estimates. The p-value is in brackets.   
Countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Time 
span: 1974-1998.  
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Table A5 – Euro area countries, longer time sample 
 
  Nominal Private  Real Private  Nominal Public  Real Public 
  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM  2SLS  GMM 
-0.470**  -0.202*  -0.194  0.114  -0.059  -0.133  0.026  0.021  ? Unemployment 
rate  (-2.3)  (-1.7)  (-0.85)  (0.71)  (-0.18)  (-0.83)  (0.08)  (0.13) 
0.359**  0.300**  0.301*  0.301*  -0.022  0.005  -0.019  -0.026  Total factor 
productivity growth  (2.27)  (2.04)  (1.65)  (1.89)  (-0.08)  (0.04)  (-0.06)  (-0.15) 
0.489***  0.433***  -0.044  -0.057*  0.668***  0.605***  -0.066  -0.114***  Inflation rate 
(7.61)  (7.18)  (-0.77)  (-1.78)  (11.11)  (7.83)  (-1.51)  (-2.98) 
0.119*  0.211***  0.08  0.307***          Growth rate of real 
public sector wages  (1.8)  (5.37)  (1.01)  (5.75)         
        0.740***  0.627***  0.507***  0.647***  Growth rate of real 
private sector wages          (4.27)  (11.57)  (2.89)  (24.56) 
0.208  0.232***  0.301*  0.291***          Growth rate of public 
employment  (1.47)  (3.99)  (1.87)  (3.8)         
        0.302***  0.174***  0.333***  0.176***  Budget balance 
        (4.13)  (2.63)  (4.5)  (2.62) 
0.434***  0.489***  0.285***  0.270***  0.158***  0.214**  0.176***  0.188***  Lagged dependent 
Variable  (7.55)  (9.05)  (4.92)  (3.09)  (3.03)  (2.52)  (3.61)  (3) 
0.026*  0.029***  0.015  0.026**  -0.116***  -0.097***  -0.115***  -0.103***  Error correction 
component  (1.91)  (2.94)  (0.99)  (2.17)  (-6.28)  (-5.8)  (-6.2)  (-5.88) 
R
2 


























(0.000)    24.69 
(0.001)    -    54.66 
(0.000)   
Observations  357  357  357  357  347  347  347  347 
Countries  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11 
 
Notes: The following variables are considered endogenous: unemployment rate, growth rate of total factor productivity, inflation rate, terms 
of trade, hours per worker, growth rate of real per worker public sector wages, budget balance, growth rate of real per worker private sector 
wages. These endogenous variables are instrumented by three lags of all explanatory variables. The t statistics are in parentheses. For the 
2SLS estimation, the conventional standard errors were used. For the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator robust standard errors were used. 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent.
. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
# The null 
hypothesis of the Sargan overidentification test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of 
overidentifying restrictions. The p-value is in brackets.
 $ The null hypothesis is that the block of macroeconomic variables is exogenous. 
Under the null, the most efficient estimator is fixed effects estimation taking all variables as exogenous. Under the alternative hypothesis the 
estimates are consistent estimates. The p-value is in brackets.   
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Note: All impulses are in percentage deviations from their steady-state value. Solid line corresponds to the case 
with  0.10
g L = , the dash line to the case with   0.15
g L =  and the dotted line to  0.20
g L =  
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Note: All impulses are in percentage deviations from their steady-state value. Solid line corresponds to the case 
with  /1.00
gp ww = , the dash line to the case with   /1.05
gp ww =  and the dotted line to 
/1.10
gp ww = . 
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Appendix 3 – Stylised data on wages and employment 
Charts 1-19 
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